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Protect your sources & confidentiality

A practical guide to protecting source identities and concealing sensitive personal data

Drilon Buzuku
Faceless bust of a statue supporting a broken capital on her head, from Views in the Levant.

Image: Views in the Levant: Faceless Bust of Statue Supporting a Broken Capital on Her Head. Public domain image via Rawpixel, from the Yale Center for British Art.

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Keeping information confidential can pose a real challenge with today’s level of digital surveillance. Automation tools and AI Agents don’t make this task easier. Handling confidential information with care, has a ethical component that comes with it. Protecting sources is crucial to an ongoing investigation. Leaked data could pressure witnesses and put sources in dangerous positions.

This guide focuses on how to reduce risks when handling sensitive information, protect the identities of confidential sources, and prevent the unintended disclosure of personal data throughout the investigative process.

Table of contents

This guide walks through the risks of handling sensitive information during an investigation and how to reduce them. Using a fictional investigation, we’ll cover:

What data could expose a source? Introduction to PII

PII stands for Personally Identifiable Information and is divided into two categories. Direct PII and indirect PII. Direct PII refers to information that can identify a person on its own, such as a full name, passport number, or identification number.

Indirect PII refers to information that can identify a person when combined with other data, such as date of birth, gender, ZIP code, or location.

Understanding OSINT risks in images, PDFs, and metadata

Images, PDFs, Documents and other files contain traces of information that could expose critical information of individuals, investigative methods or sensitive case information. Modern smartphones often embed GPS coordinates of where a photo was taken, or the name of the phones user. PDFs can contain authors, digital signatures and hidden content of poorly redacted files.

Metadata can contain:

  • Personal Information
  • Location Information
  • Timestamps
  • Device Information
  • Software Information
  • Organizational Information
  • Document Properties
  • File Paths
  • Revision Information
  • Reviewer Information
  • Investigation-Related Information
  • Embedded Metadata
  • and more

Introduction to the fictional investigation

To illustrate how a political smear campaign might unfold, this article draws on the fictional account of John Doe. A former employee of a communications contractor who claims to have been involved in an operation to discredit a Vienna city council candidate. In his account, Doe describes the use of fabricated message screenshots, forged receipts, and an AI-generated video designed to impersonate the candidate.

The interview itself is entirely fictional. All individuals, campaigns, documents, and events have been invented for illustrative purposes. Only the Vienna landmarks referenced are real.

Examining a sample interview transcript

Download the fictional WebVTT example.


00:00:00.000 –> 00:00:06.000 Drilon: You contacted us about a political misinformation operation in Vienna. Why?

00:00:06.000 –> 00:00:12.000 John Doe: Because I helped discredit a candidate using evidence we knew was fake.

00:00:12.000 –> 00:00:18.000 Drilon: Who was the target of this campaign?

00:00:18.000 –> 00:00:24.000 John Doe: Johanna Felsenbruck, a city council candidate campaigning on housing reform.

00:00:24.000 –> 00:00:30.000 Drilon: And what was your role in the operation?

00:00:30.000 –> 00:00:36.000 John Doe: I worked for a private communications contractor. I reviewed internal campaign files.

00:00:36.000 –> 00:00:42.000 Drilon: What did those files reveal?

00:00:42.000 –> 00:00:48.000 John Doe: A project called Nebel, designed to make Johanna look corrupt and dishonest.

00:00:48.000 –> 00:00:54.000 Drilon: Let’s start with the so-called private leaks. What were they?

00:00:54.000 –> 00:01:00.000 John Doe: Screenshots of messages supposedly written by Johanna to a wealthy property developer.

00:01:00.000 –> 00:01:06.000 Drilon: Were those messages authentic?

00:01:06.000 –> 00:01:12.000 John Doe: No. In our internal correspondence, they were described as fictional drafts.

00:01:12.000 –> 00:01:18.000 Drilon: But outside the team, they were presented as confidential conversations?

00:01:18.000 –> 00:01:24.000 John Doe: Exactly. People were supposed to believe someone close to her had leaked them.

00:01:24.000 –> 00:01:30.000 Drilon: What did the fake messages accuse her of doing?

00:01:30.000 –> 00:01:36.000 John Doe: Secretly promising favors in exchange for donations connected to development near the Prater.

00:01:36.000 –> 00:01:42.000 Drilon: Did anyone possess evidence of such a deal?

00:01:42.000 –> 00:01:48.000 John Doe: Not in the records I saw. The allegation came before any supposed proof.

00:01:48.000 –> 00:01:54.000 Drilon: You also gave us photographs of receipts. What were they meant to show?

00:01:54.000 –> 00:02:00.000 John Doe: Supposed private dinners and expensive hotel stays billed to campaign supporters.

00:02:00.000 –> 00:02:06.000 Drilon: Where were those expenses supposedly incurred?

00:02:06.000 –> 00:02:12.000 John Doe: One receipt named a venue near Karlsplatz; another mentioned the MuseumsQuartier.

00:02:12.000 –> 00:02:18.000 Drilon: Were they genuine receipts from those locations?

00:02:18.000 –> 00:02:24.000 John Doe: No. The venues were used as believable scenery. The documents were fabricated.

00:02:24.000 –> 00:02:30.000 Drilon: What made you certain the receipts were forged?

00:02:30.000 –> 00:02:36.000 John Doe: I saw the internal review saying they were mock-ups, not financial records.

00:02:36.000 –> 00:02:42.000 Drilon: Then a video appeared online. What did it seem to show?

00:02:42.000 –> 00:02:48.000 John Doe: Johanna apparently admitting she would sell access to influential donors.

00:02:48.000 –> 00:02:54.000 Drilon: Was that a real recording of her?

00:02:54.000 –> 00:03:00.000 John Doe: No. The team called it an AI-generated impersonation, with synthetic speech.

00:03:00.000 –> 00:03:06.000 Drilon: Did you witness the video being created?

00:03:06.000 –> 00:03:12.000 John Doe: No. I saw the approval notes and the resulting file, not its production.

00:03:12.000 –> 00:03:18.000 Drilon: That’s an important limit. What about the candidate’s personal information?

00:03:18.000 –> 00:03:24.000 John Doe: The fake dossier listed 14 September 1989 as her date of birth.

00:03:24.000 –> 00:03:30.000 Drilon: It also listed a home address and an email contact?

00:03:30.000 –> 00:03:36.000 John Doe: Yes: Fiktivgasse 0, 1020 Wien, and johanna.felsenbruck@example.com. Both invented.

00:03:36.000 –> 00:03:42.000 Drilon: So the dossier mixed plausible-looking personal details with accusations?

00:03:42.000 –> 00:03:48.000 John Doe: Yes. It was designed to look like a stolen private file.

00:03:48.000 –> 00:03:54.000 Drilon: Where did your team discuss how the public was reacting?

00:03:54.000 –> 00:04:00.000 John Doe: In briefings near Rathausplatz and in reports about public reactions in Favoriten.

00:04:00.000 –> 00:04:06.000 Drilon: Did the campaign’s records identify who paid for the operation?

00:04:06.000 –> 00:04:12.000 John Doe: They named an intermediary contractor. I cannot verify the ultimate client.

00:04:12.000 –> 00:04:18.000 Drilon: Why are you giving us these files now?

00:04:18.000 –> 00:04:24.000 John Doe: Because fabricated evidence can follow a person long after a rumor is disproved.

00:04:24.000 –> 00:04:30.000 Drilon: Our newsroom has checked the inconsistencies and sought independent corroboration.

00:04:30.000 –> 00:04:36.000 John Doe: Good. My testimony should not be accepted without verification either.

00:04:36.000 –> 00:04:42.000 Drilon: What is the most damaging lesson from what you witnessed?

00:04:42.000 –> 00:04:48.000 John Doe: A fake leak, a forged receipt, and a deepfake can reinforce one another.

00:04:48.000 –> 00:04:54.000 Drilon: And what should viewers do when they encounter material like that?

00:04:54.000 –> 00:05:00.000 John Doe: Look for original sources and independent confirmation before sharing accusations.

Redacting sensitive information with Ardi Redact

Plenty of redaction tools exist. Depending on how sensitive the data is, it should be redacted either with a tool directly processing on your computer or through a service you can trust. The first option is always the better one, if possible.

For this showcase, the Ardi Redact Tool meets the local processing for redaction requirements. To start, download and install Ardi Redact on your computer. Open Ardi Redact and choose the transcript file you downloaded from Ardi. Select the language used in the transcript and click Redact document.

Ardi Redact with a WebVTT transcript selected and the document language options shown

Ardi Redact creates a separate redacted copy and leaves the original file unchanged. WebVTT notes, metadata, and styles are preserved but are not. They need to be removed manually. When the redacted copy is ready, select Save redacted file.

Ardi Redact results showing detected personal details, a WebVTT review warning, and the save button

Reviewing WebVTT subtitle files for sensitive information

This is the transcript after redaction. Detected personal details have been replaced with labels such as [PERSON_1] and [LOCATION_1]. Nonetheless some identifying details may always remain. Reviewing the redacted file is essential.


00:00:00.000 –> 00:00:06.000 [PERSON_1]: You contacted us about a political misinformation operation in [LOCATION_1]. [LOCATION_2]?

00:00:06.000 –> 00:00:12.000 [PERSON_2]: Because I helped discredit a candidate using evidence we knew was fake.

00:00:12.000 –> 00:00:18.000 [PERSON_1]: Who was the target of this campaign?

00:00:18.000 –> 00:00:24.000 [PERSON_2]: [PERSON_3], a city council candidate [LOCATION_3].

00:00:24.000 –> 00:00:30.000 [PERSON_1]: And what was your role in the operation?

00:00:30.000 –> 00:00:36.000 [PERSON_2]: I worked for a private communications contractor. I reviewed internal campaign files.

00:00:36.000 –> 00:00:42.000 [PERSON_1]: What did those files reveal?

00:00:42.000 –> 00:00:48.000 [PERSON_2]: A project called Nebel, designed to make Johanna look corrupt and dishonest.

00:00:48.000 –> 00:00:54.000 [PERSON_1]: Let’s start with the so-called private leaks. What were they?

00:00:54.000 –> 00:01:00.000 [PERSON_2]: Screenshots of messages supposedly written by Johanna to a wealthy property developer.

00:01:00.000 –> 00:01:06.000 [PERSON_1]: Were those messages authentic?

00:01:06.000 –> 00:01:12.000 [PERSON_2]: No. In our internal [PERSON_4], they were described as [PERSON_5].

00:01:12.000 –> 00:01:18.000 [PERSON_1]: But outside the team, they were presented as confidential conversations?

00:01:18.000 –> 00:01:24.000 [PERSON_2]: [PERSON_6]. People were supposed to believe someone close to her had leaked them.

00:01:24.000 –> 00:01:30.000 [PERSON_1]: What did the fake messages accuse her of doing?

00:01:30.000 –> 00:01:36.000 [PERSON_2]: Secretly promising favors in exchange for donations connected to development near the Prater.

00:01:36.000 –> 00:01:42.000 [PERSON_1]: Did anyone possess evidence of such a deal?

00:01:42.000 –> 00:01:48.000 [PERSON_2]: Not in the records I saw. The allegation came before any supposed proof.

00:01:48.000 –> 00:01:54.000 [PERSON_1]: You also gave us photographs of receipts. What were they meant to show?

00:01:54.000 –> 00:02:00.000 [PERSON_2]: Supposed private dinners and expensive hotel stays billed to campaign supporters.

00:02:00.000 –> 00:02:06.000 [PERSON_1]: Where were those expenses supposedly incurred?

00:02:06.000 –> 00:02:12.000 [PERSON_2]: One receipt named a venue near Karlsplatz; [LOCATION_4].

00:02:12.000 –> 00:02:18.000 [PERSON_1]: Were they genuine receipts from those locations?

00:02:18.000 –> 00:02:24.000 [PERSON_2]: No. The venues were used as believable scenery. The documents were fabricated.

00:02:24.000 –> 00:02:30.000 [PERSON_1]: What made you certain the receipts were forged?

00:02:30.000 –> 00:02:36.000 [PERSON_2]: I saw the internal review saying they were mock-ups, not financial records.

00:02:36.000 –> 00:02:42.000 [PERSON_1]: Then a video appeared online. What did it seem to show?

00:02:42.000 –> 00:02:48.000 [PERSON_2]: [PERSON_7] she would sell access to influential donors.

00:02:48.000 –> 00:02:54.000 [PERSON_1]: Was that a real recording of her?

00:02:54.000 –> 00:03:00.000 [PERSON_2]: No. The team called it an AI-generated impersonation, with synthetic speech.

00:03:00.000 –> 00:03:06.000 [PERSON_1]: Did you witness the video being created?

00:03:06.000 –> 00:03:12.000 [PERSON_2]: No. I saw the approval notes and the resulting file, not its production.

00:03:12.000 –> 00:03:18.000 [PERSON_1]: That’s an important limit. What about the candidate’s personal information?

00:03:18.000 –> 00:03:24.000 [PERSON_2]: The fake dossier listed 14 September 1989 as her date of birth.

00:03:24.000 –> 00:03:30.000 [PERSON_1]: It also listed a home address and an email contact?

00:03:30.000 –> 00:03:36.000 [PERSON_2]: Yes: Fiktivgasse 0, 1020 [LOCATION_5], and [EMAIL_1]. [PERSON_8] invented.

00:03:36.000 –> 00:03:42.000 [PERSON_1]: So the dossier mixed plausible-looking personal details with accusations?

00:03:42.000 –> 00:03:48.000 [PERSON_2]: Yes. It was designed to look like a stolen private file.

00:03:48.000 –> 00:03:54.000 [PERSON_1]: Where did your team discuss how the public was reacting?

00:03:54.000 –> 00:04:00.000 [PERSON_2]: In [LOCATION_6] in reports about public reactions in [LOCATION_7].

00:04:00.000 –> 00:04:06.000 [PERSON_1]: Did the campaign’s records identify who paid for the operation?

00:04:06.000 –> 00:04:12.000 [PERSON_2]: They named an [PERSON_9]. I cannot verify the ultimate client.

00:04:12.000 –> 00:04:18.000 [PERSON_1]: Why are you giving us these files now?

00:04:18.000 –> 00:04:24.000 [PERSON_2]: Because fabricated evidence can follow a person long after a rumor is disproved.

00:04:24.000 –> 00:04:30.000 [PERSON_1]: Our newsroom has checked the inconsistencies and sought independent corroboration.

00:04:30.000 –> 00:04:36.000 [PERSON_2]: Good. My testimony should not be accepted without verification either.

00:04:36.000 –> 00:04:42.000 [PERSON_1]: What is the most damaging lesson from what you witnessed?

00:04:42.000 –> 00:04:48.000 [PERSON_2]: A fake leak, a forged receipt, and a deepfake can reinforce one another.

00:04:48.000 –> 00:04:54.000 [PERSON_1]: And what should viewers do when they encounter material like that?

00:04:54.000 –> 00:05:00.000 [PERSON_2]: Look for original sources and independent confirmation before [PERSON_10].

The redacted document is almost finished, but upon further inspection some sensitive information was still readable. Check whether you can spot the potential risks and correct them.

Removing image metadata with Ardi Metadata Remover

As described earlier, images and PDFs can contain information that is not visible when opening them. This information is called metadata. It can include where a photo was taken, which device created it, or who authored a document. Metadata can expose sensitive details about a source or an investigation.

To remove metadata, open Ardi Metadata Remover and select a JPEG, PNG, WebP, or PDF file up to 25 MB. The cleaning process takes place directly in the browser, and the file is not sent to our servers. Once completed, download the cleaned file.

Alternatively, FFmpeg can be used to remove metadata from images, while ExifTool can remove PDF metadata. Additional steps may be required to ensure it is fully erased. AI frontier models such as Gemini, ChatGPT, Mistral, or Claude can also generate scripts to remove metadata and are safe to use.